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Abstract: During the last century the social sciences grew from the stage of speculative system build-
ing to a more mature development in which empirical data are sought for the significance they can have 
for systematic theories. A lot of work in this field concerns itself with determining the methodological and 
conceptual prerequisites for a mature science of human reasoning and behavior. Modeling human reason-
ing and human behavior, although currently focused on social and economic phenomena like organizations, 
organizational knowledge, leadership, cooperation etc., are historically dependent upon modeling natural 
phenomena in physical science, precisely because physical science tackles successfully the issue of building 
upon empirical data. This paper pursues an apparently small, but nonetheless significant, historical claim 
concerning the “relative position of human reasoning and mechanics” a claim made possible by the devel-
opment of late 19th century’s epistemology of science (mainly Heinrich Hertz’s) and theoretical philosophy 
(Ludwig Wittgenstein). The main idea of the paper is that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of “logical repre-
sentation”, seen as a landmark for what human reasoning is about, is an intricate analogue to the Hertzian 
“dynamic models” from the Principles of Mechanics. This analogy is analyzed and explained with regard 
to the problem of the “logic of color”.
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1. introduction
Almost every specialist in social scienc-
es (and especially in economics) is familiar 
with game-theory, a very strong logico-math-
ematical tool used to model human behavior: 
e.g. cooperative behavior, organizations’ dy-
namics, the emergence of social groups and 
group norms, the emergence and features 
of leadership based on cooperative/ defec-
tive behavior etc. This tool is also effective 
in studying human reasoning and cognitive 
biases from an evolutionary perspective and 
that is why it fits well in the analysis of group 
phenomena especially when the dynamics of 
such groups becomes significant for econom-
ics or for sociology. But the tradition of using 
logical or mathematical modeling, in order 
to capture human reasoning and human ac-
tion in various practical contexts that under-
go aggregation and change, spreads from a 
much older root. In fact, logico-mathemat-
ical modeling is historically and conceptu-
ally connected with the activity of modeling 
natural phenomena in physical science. This 
practice is made explicit, for instance, in the 
development of the late 19th century’s episte-
mology of science (H. Hertz, L. Boltzmann), 
and it relies on the concept of “dynamic mod-
els” from classical mechanics and on several 
philosophical developments regarding the 
concept of human reasoning as an activity of 
manipulating  and  integrating  “representa-
tions” (L. Wittgenstein).
The conceptual interplay between 
“representations”,  “models”  and  “dynam-
ics” appears in the writings of several im-
portant nineteenth century scientists and 
epistemologists of science such as Heinrich 
Hertz, Hermann von Helmholtz and Ludwig 
Boltzmann. Hermann von Helmholtz, for in-
stance, is the author of a theory of perceptions 
as projections on abstract n-dimensional man-
ifolds that allow for perceptual reasoning as 
dynamic transformations on these manifolds, 
while Ludwig Boltzmann is credited with the 
idea that the language of science is an integrat-
ing image (Bild) of physical reality. Starting 
from here a large number of commentators   
and interpreters (P. Baker, P.M.S. Hacker, 
N.Griffin,  E.  Stenius,  E.  Anscombe  etc.)  of 
Ludwig  Wittgenstein’s  early  philosophical 
writings have suggested different hypoth-
eses regarding the signification of “images” 
(Bilder) in his philosophical work Tractatus 
logico-philosophicus. One interpretation 
(Visser, 1999) associates early Wittgenstein’s 
account of propositions as images with von 
Helmholtz’s  phenomenological  analysis  of 
perception. Thus, the proposition as an “im-
age” (Bild) of reality is the expression of a 
Vorstellung (or inner representation) and it 
is composed of elementary sense-data. By 
contrast, other interpretations (Hyder, 2002; 
Hamilton, 2002), relate Wittgenstein’s thesis 
that propositions are images with a physical-
ist perspective on representation. According 
to such points of view, propositional images 
are expressions of material representations 
of reality (Darstellungen) that form indepen-
dently from the mind and are composed of 
real  objects  (like  physical  atoms).  It  is  sig-
nificant to note that the distinction between 
these two kinds of representations – inner 
(Vorstellungen)  and  material  representa-
tions (Darstellungen) – was used by Ludwig 
Boltzmann to distinguish science from phe-
nomenological epistemology. In his view, 
material representations of reality were gen-
erated by the laws of physics and they satis-
fied certain conditions of validity that inner 
representations could not satisfy.133 Change and Leadership
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If we take a close look at Tractatus 
logico-philosophicus, it is quite obvious 
that Ludwig Wittgenstein is not referring to 
physical atoms, nor to elementary sense-data 
(meant to build up a subjective experience of 
reality) when speaking about Bilder, but to 
a generic notion of atom involved in human 
reasoning. My thesis is that it might be in-
sightful to pay attention to Heinrich Hertz’s 
theory of dynamic models if we want to fully 
understand Wittgenstein’s idea that the lin-
guistic  entities  (i.e.  propositions)  involved 
in  human  reasoning  are  “images”  (Bilder) 
made of logical atoms.
In his Mechanics, the physicist Heinrich 
Hertz talks about a geometrical representa-
tion of nature. His point of view is, in some 
respects, perplexing. Hertz refers to his 
models  both  in  terms  of  “mental  images” 
(Scheinbilder)  and  of  “physical  representa-
tions”  (Darstellungen)  of  nature  by  means 
of physical laws. However, his choices of 
words and concepts may lead the researcher 
astray. It is a fact that in the late nineteenth 
century physics and epistemology of science 
there was no unanimous consensus regard-
ing to what a model of nature really is. This 
may explain some of Hertz’s ambiguities, but 
also blur some of his theoretical intentions. 
That is why I shall bring into focus a more 
specific and technical distinction that could 
give a clearer meaning to Hertz’s conception 
of models. What I have in mind is the dis-
tinction between the “scenario” of a dynamic 
model (a concept that would explain Hertz’s 
notion of Scheinbild) and the “parameterized 
representation” of a physical phenomenon 
within a dynamic model that would corre-
spond to Hertz’s notion of Darstellung.
The most important feature of a dy-
namic model is that it follows the temporal 
evolution of a phenomenon (like motion, 
for  instance)  by  extracting  physical  conse-
quences from an initial state – described, 
in principle, by a bunch of partial informa-
tion. A dynamic model allows us to derive 
correctly future states of a physical system 
even though we do not have a complete rep-
resentation of the initial state of that system. 
A good example would be the differential 
representation of motion – where masses 
and forces that act upon material points are 
neglected. However, the partial informa-
tion needed has to be organized in a relevant 
manner in order to allow for the extraction 
of desired consequences (for instance, time 
and position must be considered indepen-
dently). This incomplete, but organized, in-
formation is what it is called the “scenario” 
of a model. It is interesting to see that in his 
introduction to the Principles of Mechanics, 
Heinrich Hertz is using a very similar con-
cept, Scheinbilder:
“We form for ourselves images [innere 
Scheinbilder] or symbols of external objects; 
and the form which we give them is such 
that necessary consequents of the images 
in thought are always images of the neces-
sary consequents in nature of the things pic-
tured.” (Hertz, 2001, 1).
A “scenario” is also abstract – it struc-
tures information into relevant entities, 
properties and relations. For instance, in the 
differential representation of motion we have 
abstract material points characterized by in-
dependent abstract properties like spatial 
and temporal position (in a motion space). 
So Heinrich Hertz seems to refer to some ab-
stract information about a state of a system, 
relevant to the extraction of necessary physi-
cal  consequences  (or  reliable  predictions). 
But in order to make reliable predictions, a 134 Change and Leadership
No. 17 ~ 2013
model needs, along with an adequate organi-
zation of initial information, some equations 
of condition that allow for a perspicuous cal-
culation of observable quantities such as dis-
placement. It is worthwhile to stress that in 
Hertz’s dynamic models mass is introduced 
in the motion space not as an independent 
variable, but as a parameter built in the equa-
tions of condition. This suggests that Heinrich 
Hertz had in mind a peculiar representation 
of motion and a different organization of mo-
tion “scenarios” from the standard cinematic 
representation. Indeed, he seems to propose a 
“parameterized representation” of displace-
ment or a Darstellung, through equations of 
condition with build-in parameters. This pe-
culiar approach to models (Modelle) gives a 
significant and technical load to the notion of 
Darstellung that is not present, for instance, 
in Boltzmann’s account, and yet, as we are 
about to see in the following sections, of great 
relevance to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s atomism 
from Tractatus logico-philosophicus.
2. Dynamic models
  Wittgenstein’s  references  to  Hertz’s 
dynamic models in the Tractatus are rather 
scarce. In fact, the only explicit reference is to 
be found at 4.04:
  “In a proposition there must be ex-
actly as many distinguishable parts as in the 
situation that it represents. The two must 
possess the same logical (mathematical) mul-
tiplicity. (Compare Hertz’s Mechanics on dy-
namical models.)”
This passage brings into focus two re-
lated issues: first, the connection between 
propositional “parts” or elements and logical 
multiplicity  (Mannifältihkeit),  and  second, 
the correlation between logical multiplicity 
and models. It is relevant to stress that in 
the secondary literature there are loads of 
studies that concentrate on the first issue, 
while to the second the references are rather 
few (Barker, 1980; Grasshoff, 1998; Tougas, 
199;, Lammpert 2000). Usually, the concept 
of  logical  multiplicity  (Mannifältihkeit)  is 
considered a terminological influence from 
Hertz, with no substantial connection to the 
theory of dynamic models presented in his 
Principles of Mechanics. In the following, 
I shall argue that Wittgenstein’s concept of 
Mannifältihkeit bears indeed a substantial 
connection to the theory of dynamic models 
from Hertzian mechanics, and that this con-
nection is important in order to give a proper 
account of early Wittgenstein’s atomism.
But first let us see what logical mul-
tiplicity  (Mannifältihkeit)  means.  I  shall 
keep certain remarks quite brief because it 
is impossible to give an extensive account 
in such a short paper. As some interpreters 
have  already  pointed  out,  Hertz’s  concept 
of Mannifältihkeit is an important influ-
ence from Riemannian geometry, absorbed 
through von Helmholtz’s theory of percep-
tion (Hyder, 2002):
„Riemann calls a system of differences 
in which the individual element can be de-
termined by n measurements, a n-fold mani-
fold, or a manifold of n dimensions. Thus 
the space that we know and in which we live 
is a three-fold extended manifold, a plane a 
two-fold, and a line a one-fold manifold, as is 
indeed time. The system of colors also consti-
tutes a three-fold manifold, in that each color 
can be represented… as a mixture of three el-
ementary colors, of each of which a definite 
quantum is to be chosen… we could just as 
well describe the domain of simple tones as 
a manifold of two dimensions, if we are to 135 Change and Leadership
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take them to be differentiated only by pitch 
and volume.” 1
According to von Helmholtz all our em-
pirical knowledge is organized in complexes 
of elementary data, called manifolds. Colors, 
sounds, time etc. are such manifolds. The ba-
sic idea borrowed from Riemann’s geometry 
is that any quantity can be defined as a point 
in a space of n-dimensional measurements. 
Of course, in order to get an adequate mea-
surement of the desired quantities, it is nec-
essary to determine the right multiplicity of 
the magnitude space, i.e. the correct number 
of dimensions. In this respect, von Helmholtz 
uses a phenomenological device – i.e. how 
colors, sounds, time etc. form in human per-
ception. Thus, he observes that colors can 
be analyzed 3-dimensionally as mixtures of 
three elementary colors; sounds can by ana-
lyzed 2-dimensionally by measuring pitch 
and intensity; time is a 1-dimensional object 
of our inner perception etc. So multiplicity 
is determined phenomenologically and this 
seems to be one of the key aspects of Herman 
von  Helmholtz’s  epistemology.  His  mani-
folds are perceptual manifolds. Interestingly, 
they seem to offer a good account of Ludwig 
Boltzmann’s concept of Vorstellung. As we 
have seen in the first part, a Vorstellung is a 
sort of internal model of reality. Perceptual 
manifolds are in von Helmholtz’s epistemol-
ogy internal models of reality – with ade-
quate multiplicity.
Keeping  these  observations  in  mind, 
we could see by analogy what the author of 
the Tractatus meant by his concept of logi-
cal multiplicity. Let us start with a simple 
example,  a  sentence  like:  “This  stick  is  1.5 
meters  long”.  We  may  ask  ourselves  now 
what does it mean for a stick to be 1.5 meters 
1 (Hyder, 2002, 26).
long? It seems that in order to be able to talk 
about length we need a system of measure-
ments for length, such as a yardstick, i.e., a 
1-dimensional  manifold.  Without  the  one-
fold of length, the sentence “This stick is 1.5 
meters long” would not have any meaning. 
Likewise, any sentence bears with it a system 
of logical “measurements”: we know, for in-
stance, when a sentence refers to an object, to 
a property, a relation etc. We may spot eas-
ily such differences as between “John is in 
the yard” and “Yellow is brighter than gray”, 
although the mechanism of such differenc-
es is by far more intricate than in the case 
of length. To such differences was intended 
to  answer,  for  instance,  Betrand  Russell’s 
theory of types. However, never convinced 
by  Russell’s  theory,  Ludwig  Wittgenstein 
chose in the Tractatus a different solution, 
i.e. to deal away with predicative and rela-
tional concepts and present the system of 
logical differences in a quite original manner: 
the projection (Abbildung) of sentences like 
“John is in the yard” and “Yellow is brighter 
than gray” on an aggregate of logical mani-
folds (called logical space). 
The logical measurements (that give the 
logical multiplicity of a situation like John’s 
presence in the yard) are introduced in lan-
guage along with each sentence like lengths 
are introduced along with each quantity-
expression: “1 meter”, “2 meters” etc., and 
therefore each sentence is associated with a 
manifold model, called by the author of the 
Tractatus, Darstellung. Later in Philosophical 
Remarks,  Ludwig  Wittgenstein  recalls  this 
approach of associating sentences and situa-
tions with the idea of logical manifolds:
“When I built language up by using a 
coordinate system for representing a state of 
affairs in space, I introduced into language an 136 Change and Leadership
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element which it doesn’t normally use. This 
device is surely permissible. And it shows 
the connection between language and reality. 
The written sign without the coordinate sys-
tem is senseless.” 2
But, in order for this approach to work, 
it is necessary to express correctly the mul-
tiplicity of the situation (i.e. its correct num-
ber  of  dimensions).  As  mentioned  before, 
Hermann von Helmholtz used a phenome-
nological device: how qualities decompose in 
perception. Although Wittgenstein often re-
fers (especially in “Some Remarks on Logical 
Form”  and  in  Philosophical  Remarks)  to  a 
color and a sound space and even to the vi-
sual field as a substitution for physical space 
when presenting his examples, he does not 
seem to have in mind a Helmholtzian phe-
nomenological reduction, but only some per-
tinent analogies. His statement concerning 
multiplicity (Mannifältihkeit) is referring to 
propositional and factual “parts” that can be 
depicted via a projection on coordinate sys-
tems corresponding to logical properties. A 
clearer image of this perspective can be found 
in Betrand Russell’s lecture on logical atom-
ism from 1924 (three years after the publica-
tion of Tractatus logico-philosophicus):
“When  some  set  of  supposed  entities 
has neat logical properties, it turns out, in a 
great many instances, that the supposed enti-
ties can be replaced by purely logical struc-
tures without altering in any detail any of the 
body of propositions in question.”3 
These logical structures may be in fact 
the manifolds that Ludwig Wittgenstein had 
in mind in the Tractatus. I shall try to develop 
this idea next.
2 PR, 46,79.
3 (Landini, 2003,108).
In his Principles of Mechanics Heinrich 
Hertz defines a dynamic model in the follow-
ing manner.  A material system (or a system 
of material points) is a dynamic model of an-
other material system if and only if the two 
systems have:
a) the same number of coordinates of 
position;
b) the same equations of condition;
c) the same magnitude of displacement.
  It should be pointed out that condi-
tion (b) is by far the most interesting. If the 
first is referring to the projection (Abbildung) 
of a physical system on a coordinate space, 
and the third refers to the conservation of 
displacement, the second one stipulates the 
existence of the same equations of condition 
in both systems. The question is: why could 
they be different? Let us think of some exam-
ples. Let us suppose that we want to model 
the trajectory of a physical system with two 
material points that move through space. 
According to Hertz the model would be char-
acterized by:
a) some spatial coordinates;
b)  assuming  that  the  system  contains 
“hidden masses”, we will have to express the 
path of the two points by referring to their 
hidden masses in such a manner that their 
(geometrical) path in the configuration space 
will conform to the spatial displacement of 
the system described without the hidden 
masses;
c) a magnitude for displacement.
We could make this example even more 
intuitive  focusing  on  condition  (b).  Let  us 
think of the physical system formed by the 
Earth and the Moon. As we all know the plan-
ets of our solar system are situated at consid-
erable distances from one another and that 
is why they can be represented in classical 137 Change and Leadership
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mechanics as material points (without mass) 
revolving around the Sun. For instance, the 
distance between the planet Mars and the 
Earth is big enough to neglect the gravita-
tional attraction exerted and therefore we can 
represent them as material points in motion. 
However, the physical system formed by 
the Earth and the Moon cannot be described 
likewise because the two bodies are close 
enough as to exert observable gravitational 
effects one upon the other. This means that 
their masses are relevant to their motion. Yet, 
Hertz wants to reduce forces from classical 
mechanics and express gravitational effects 
in terms of free systems (like the Earth-Mars 
system  from  our  example)  with  some  hid-
den masses that would constrain internally 
the system’s motion. In order to do that, he 
needs to introduce in his mechanics some 
new elements:
“It is always permissible to regard a sys-
tem of material points as being composed of 
an infinite number of material particles.” (H. 
Hertz, 2002, 46)
But what makes this formal trick per-
missible? Simply said, it is the equations of 
condition stating that the spatial displace-
ment of the Earth-Moon, for instance, is 
equal to the geometrical path of a system 
with an infinite number of material particles 
in a configuration space. It is obvious that 
Hertz is referring here to the same kind of 
permissibility as is Ludwig Wittgenstein in 
Philosophical Remarks. Each physical body 
with mass can be regarded as an n-dimen-
sional point in a geometrical manifold called 
the configuration space4  as long as the spatial 
4 “... it [mass] can be thought of as divided into ar-
bitrarily many equal mass-particles, each of which 
indestructible and able to serve as a characteristic 
in order to definitely and unambiguously coordi-
nate one point in space with another point in spa-
ce at another time.” (Hertz 1953, 300).
displacement and the geometrical path of the 
body are equal, or more philosophically put:
“...  if  we  regard  the  condition  of  the 
model as the representation [my emphasis] 
of the condition of the system, then the con-
sequents of this representation (...) are also 
the representation of the consequents which 
must  proceed  from  the  original  object...” 
(Hertz, 2002, 177).
So such a formal trick is permissible only 
if it leads to correct predictions, and the key 
to making correct predictions lays, among 
other things, in finding the right equations of 
condition for the model, such as expressing 
displacement in terms of geometrical paths.
Here it seems that multiplicity (the 
number of coordinates of motion) is not es-
tablished by phenomenological analysis as 
in von Helmholtz’s epistemology, but more 
likely through some sort of a priori analysis 
of matter, focused on the conditions of me-
chanical representation of physical bodies. 
This point of view has been expressed by 
several authors interested in the epistemol-
ogy that underlies Hertz’s system of mechan-
ics, and was also emphasized by Ludwig 
Boltzmann. Often cited is the following frag-
ment from the Principles of Mechanics:
“The agreement between mind and na-
ture  may  by  (...)  likened  to  the  agreement 
between two systems which are models of 
one another, and we can even count for this 
agreement by assuming that the mind is ca-
pable of making actual dynamical models of 
things, and working with them” (Hertz, 2002, 
177).
The “hidden masses” in Hertzian me-
chanics are in fact elementary positions in the 
configuration space (an n¬-dimensional man-
ifold) to which a model associates semanti-
cally some generic material characteristics 138 Change and Leadership
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and they are important in order to define a 
structure in Hertzian mechanics – the de-
grees of freedom of a physical system.
Let us go back to our example about 
the two physical systems discussed earlier: 
Earth-Mars and Earth-Moon. Stipulating that 
each system consists of n material particles 
moving in a three-dimensional Euclidian 
space, the Earth-Mars (moving without con-
straints) would be projected on a 3n configu-
ration space, while the Earth-Moon, moving 
with  constraints,  would  be  projected  on  a 
3n-k dimensional space. This means that the 
second system will have less degrees of free-
dom, given the fact that certain connections 
between particles are rigid (i.e. those corre-
sponding to gravitational attraction). So, the 
multiplicity of a model for a physical system 
is not given by the number of units of matter 
that describe the system simpliciter, but by 
its structure, i.e. the degrees of freedom that 
the system possesses. Thus, even if in our 
initial “situation” we had observable effects 
of gravitational attraction, in the geometric 
Darstellung of the system, gravitational at-
traction is dealt away or eliminated by stip-
ulating certain configurations of elementary 
material particles in an abstract space. 
3. “images” and “representations”
In the basic semantic view of how a 
proposition means something, propositions 
are  considered  “images”  (Bilder)  of  facts 
in the following sense: there is a 1:1 corre-
spondence between the elements of proposi-
tions and the elements of facts. It seems that 
Wittgenstein presents a clear model-theoret-
ical approach to meaning in the Tractatus 
(Hacker, 1981). However, this interpretation 
hides a few traps. The author of the Tractatus 
assumes the existence of a primitive 1:1 se-
mantic relation between propositional ele-
ments and elements of the world, but this 
relation is not interpreted extensionally in 
set-theoretic terms. Logical multiplicity ex-
presses not a 1:1 correspondence between 
set-theoretic extensions and names, predi-
cates etc., but the degrees of freedom or the 
structure that facts share with propositions 
in logical space with no reference whatsoever 
to extensions and types. The 1:1 correspon-
dence refers to an isomorphism of models 
with generalized coordinates.
As we have seen in the previous section, 
the basic idea behind dynamic modeling is 
that multiplicity should express the num-
ber of freedoms that a system possesses in a 
state-space. To build a dynamic “scenario” is 
to make certain assumptions regarding how 
to organize the relevant information using 
coordinates, equations of conditions and n-
dimensional vectors organized in such man-
ifolds. Actually, this is the main function of 
a  theory  of  representation  (Darstellung)  in 
Hertzian mechanics. Only after these aspects 
are settled, a dynamic model (understood as 
number of equations that define the tempo-
ral evolution of the system) could express the 
evolution of such n-dimensional vectors in 
respect to time.
In order to see the analogy between se-
mantic analysis and dynamic modeling in 
Tractatus, I suggest going back again to our 
example with the two specific physical sys-
tems: Earth-Mars and Earth-Moon. The first 
one is a free system with 6 degrees of free-
dom. The second one is not a free system, it 
has only three degrees of freedom (because 
of the gravitational attraction that forms a 
rigid connection in the configuration space 
between Earth and Moon, and so the two 139 Change and Leadership
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material  bodies  move  like  a  single  point). 
However, the Earth-Moon can be treated 
like a free system with three degrees of free-
dom. So although it consists of two material 
particles, the system is mechanically equiv-
alent to a single point and its displacement 
is analyzed as a three-dimensional vector. 
The same situation holds, as the author of 
the Tractatus points out, for propositions. 
We can have propositions like (P) “The sky 
is blue and the grass is green” and proposi-
tions like (P’) “The sky is blue and the sky is 
green”. In the first case our proposition has 
four degrees of freedom. In the second case, 
the proposition has fewer degrees of freedom 
because of color exclusion, and so the analy-
sis of (P) as: “p&q” is not a correct analysis 
(TLP 6.3751).
In order to get an elementary analysis 
we need to find an adequate Darstellung of 
(P’), and for this we need to take into consid-
eration what Wittgenstein calls “the logical 
structure of color” (TLP 6.3751) or, keeping 
in mind the analogy with Hertzian mechan-
ics, the “rigid connections” of colors. Thus, 
we need to deepen our analysis and dig for 
the structure of atomic/elementary proposi-
tions. This step into the analysis of atomic/
elementary propositions is similar to the 
step taken by some logicians from first-order 
propositional logic to first-order predicate 
logic. However, the author of the Tractatus 
does not analyze properties (like color, for in-
stance) as predicates, but prefers a Hertzian, 
eliminative approach in respect to them – a 
strategy undertook also by Bertrand Russell 
in his 1924 lecture on logical atomism (see 
section  1)  It  seems  that  atomic/elementary 
propositions as semantic “scenarios” of the 
world may be structured as n-dimensional 
manifolds by defining the degrees of freedom 
of elementary propositions in logical space, 
without making reference to logical types.
In another paper5  I presented the formal 
details of a structural analysis of elementary 
propositions as n-dimensional manifolds. I 
argued that elementary propositions cannot 
be  considered  “images”  (Bilder,  Modelle) 
of states of affairs and vice versa unless we 
define  a  “parameterized  representation” 
(Darstellung) in logical space of both elemen-
tary propositions and states of affairs. 
Here, however, I choose to focus only 
on some general aspects of such a struc-
tural analysis, in order to get a more ac-
curate  reading  of  Ludwig  Wittgenstein’s 
Bilder and Darstellungen from Tractatus 
logico-philosophicus. By appropriating the 
method of generalized coordinates from 
classical mechanics, the elementary “parts” 
of a proposition (or, in short, the elementa-
ry propositions) can be defined formally as 
“dimensions”  in  an  abstract  n-dimensional 
space called a manifold. This explains why 
Wittgenstein  takes  elementary  propositions 
to be logically independent. Nevertheless, el-
ementary “parts” – just like Hertz’s material 
points – have internal structure. Otherwise 
they could not be considered isomorphic to 
states of affairs. 
In  some  particular  cases,  like  (P),  ele-
mentary “parts” resemble the material points 
in the Earth-Mars example – i.e. they are free. 
In other cases, like (P’), elementary “parts” 
resemble the material points in the Earth-
Moon example – i.e. they hide combinato-
rial constrains. It is impossible to treat the 
elementary  “parts”  of  (P’)  as  independent 
5 “The logical independence of elementary propo-
sitions in Tractatus logico-philosophicus” (in Ro-
manian) Analele Universității București. Filosofie 
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dimensions in propositional analysis. For a 
correct analysis of (P’) it is necessary to dig 
out its complicated internal structure and es-
tablish the constraints.
 Following the Hertzian analysis of 
material points into mass particles we may 
describe briefly the structural analysis with 
constraints in the following terms:
i) Formally, each proposition p can be 
analyzed into manifolds of the form Mn, 
where M is the topological base (i.e. the T-F 
base given that each proposition is either true 
or false), and n is the number of freedoms de-
fined on M. A proposition p with n atomic/
independent parts is a 2n manifold. A propo-
sition with n-k atomic/independent parts is 
a 2n-k manifold. This can be expressed more 
perspicuously in the following manner:
  a) given a proposition p with a T-F 
base (M) and n elementary parts, the corre-
sponding manifold for n dimensions with 0 
constraints would be Mn.
  b) given a proposition p with a T-F 
base (M) and n elementary parts, the corre-
sponding manifold for n dimensions with k 
constraints would be Mn-k
ii) Then, for each freedom r defined on 
M, we assume a corresponding elementary 
state of the world or a T/F value; and for each 
Mr  we assume a corresponding matrix of el-
ementary states of the world or a matrix of 
T/F values.
In this manner, any logical representa-
tion Mn of a proposition is a n-dimensional 
manifold with 0 or   0 < k constraints. In other 
words, the manifold of a complex proposition 
is dependent upon the T/F combinations of 
elementary propositions. However, the only 
explanation for the fact that in some cases we 
have constraints upon the T/F combinations 
of elementary propositions is that elementary 
propositions have internal structure.
Two observations:
a) M is not a set; it is a topological ba-
sis  for  representing  (darstellen)  elementary 
states/ propositions in logical space.
b) n expresses the freedoms of a propo-
sition/fact in logical space, determined by the 
constraints k applied on the base M.
To illustrate these formal aspects I will 
now return to the discussion from the first 
part of this section. Thus, following a simple 
analysis of color predicates, the example I 
chose above, we see that logical structure of 
color makes certain combinations of truth-
values rigid. That is why the logical form of 
(P’) may by in fact something more compli-
cated than “p&q”6 . The logical form of (P’) 
is more likely, as Wittgenstein suggests (TLP 
6.3751) , “p& ~p”:
p   ~p  p&~p
1     0             0
0     1              0       
            (D)
(P’)  is  a  proposition  excluded  by  the 
logic of color. According to our analysis, (P’) 
may be described a 2-dimensional manifold 
of truth-values (therefore by two degrees of 
freedom). This is because the second “part” 
of  (P’)  represents  a  dimension  dependent 
upon the first “part”. Thus, instead of having 
four degrees of freedom, (P’) has only two.
Unlike (P’), (P) can be described by a 
4-dimensional manifold of truth-values (1;1) 
(0;1), (1;0), (0,0), because all combinations are 
6  “Only  when  we  analyze  phenomena  logically 
shall we know what form elementary propositi-
ons have. (...) The logical structure of elementary 
propositions need not have the slightest similarity 
with the logical structure of propositions. Just 
think of the equations of physics – how tremen-
dously complex their structure is. Elementary pro-
positions too, will have this degree of complexity” 
(WVC, 42).141 Change and Leadership
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permitted by the logic of color.
p q  p&q
1  1           1
0  1  0
1  0  0     
0  0  0
        (D1)
(D)  and  (D1)  are  Bilder  of  proposi-
tions (P) and (P’) in logical space. Their form 
is dependent upon giving the adequate 
Darstellung for (P) and (P’), i.e., upon find-
ing the right number of freedoms (or the pa-
rameter r) of the situations described by (P) 
and (P’). In the case of a free model (with no 
constraints), r = n (the maximum number of 
possible T/F combinations for conjunction). 
In the case of a model with rigid connections 
or constraints, we should have r < n.
However, it is not really clear whether 
in the Tractatus Wittgenstein accepted that 
elementary states have indeed structure – 
although he refers to “configurations of ob-
jects” (TLP, 2.01, 2.0272) as an analysis for 
elementary states of the world, quite simi-
larly to the manner in which Hertz refers 
to “configurations of mass particles” as an 
analysis for material points with mass. As we 
have seen in the previous section, mass par-
ticles do not measure mass, but they only ex-
press the dependence of the path of material 
points in the configuration space upon mass. 
Mutatis mutandis, the Tractarian objects are 
not objects per se, but rather they express the 
dependence of states of affairs, and conse-
quently of propositions, upon their internal 
structure, i.e. upon what these states actu-
ally are: colors, sounds, time etc. Each spa-
tial, temporal or color configuration leaves a 
space of 0 ≤ r ≤ n dimensions or degrees of 
freedom for combinations. For instance, no 
fact can be at the same time two different 
colors or two different sounds, but it can 
be at the same time a position and a color, a 
color and a sound etc.  The parameter r ex-
presses such dependencies in logical space 
in terms of freedoms and constraints on base 
manifolds  (M),  without  analyzing  physical 
properties (TLP, 2.0231)
From this perspective that assigns 
structure to elementary propositions and 
states, we can also get a better grasping of 
Wittgenstein’s own critique of logical analy-
sis, presented in “Some Remarks on Logical 
Form” (1929). There, he starts from the ob-
servation that a correct logical formaliza-
tion of (P’) is not “p&~p” because (P’) does 
not express a contradiction, as he believed 
in the Tractatus, but only a false statement. 
“The sky is green” is not equivalent to deny-
ing “The sky is blue”. In fact, it is possible to 
have a situation in which the sky is neither 
blue, nor green, but a sort of dark gray. And 
for this we need a different logical analysis of 
color and, more generally, a different way to 
express dependencies of states/propositions 
upon their content. The main reason why 
the type of analysis from the Tractatus fails 
is that it cannot formalize properly propo-
sitions like (P’). While (P) has four degrees 
of freedom, (P’) has only three. Most of the 
argument from RLF runs in the direction of 
showing  that:  (i)  the  second  “part”  of  (P’) 
cannot be analyzed as a rigid dimension, 
i.e. as dependent upon the first dimension 
of (P’) as in “p&~p”: we cannot obtain “The 
sky is green” by applying negation to “The 
sky is blue” because between the two colors 
there is a difference of degree that cannot be 
caught by the logical formalism of negation. 
However: (ii) the two colors are not entirely 
independent, and (P’) cannot be formalized 
as “p&q”, so the analysis from the Tractatus 
must fail in some respect.142 Change and Leadership
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Wittgenstein had in mind certain basic 
postulates regulating the behavior of argu-
ment-places for color when he discussed “the 
logic of color”. Thus, even if we cannot obtain 
straightforwardly  “The  sky  is  green”  from 
denying “The sky is blue”, we can generate 
a contradiction in the following manner. Let 
a be an object and ‘…’ indicate other argu-
ment-places which may be form indicators of 
the object (spatiotemporal position, etc.) and 
c its color. The postulate would be:
(CP) If Pa…c… then for every x which is 
a color (i.e. fills the argument-place of a col-
or) distinct from c, then ~Pa…x… .
Let “The sky is blue” be Pa…b… Now, 
by (WC), if Pa…b… then for every color x 
distinct from b, ~Pa…x…. Now, suppose that 
the sky is blue and green: Pa…b…& Pa…g…. 
Two applications of simplification, a modus 
ponens,  an  introduction  of  conjunction  are 
all it takes to obtain the contradiction. What 
Wittgenstein  was  trying  to  say  in  “Some 
Remarks on Logical Form” was that Pa…b… 
and Pa…g… are contraries: they cannot be 
both true but they can be both false. This is a 
clear consequence of (CP).
But would not this imply that all prop-
ositions with a difference in their composi-
tion contradict each other in this sense? Not 
necessarily. For example, take Px1,…, xn and 
Px1,…, xm to mean “This very person in this 
very spatiotemporal position and with this 
very color and so on is sitting on the couch” 
and “This very person in this very spatiotem-
poral position and with this very color and so 
is watching TV”, respectively. There is only 
a contradiction when there is a difference in 
the argument-place fillers when these consti-
tute part of the form of the object.
The problem with this analysis at the 
propositional level is that there is no finite 
means to express (CP) in full generality, i.e. 
for the form of any object, although it can be 
done for particular cases. The analysis from 
the  Tractatus  fails  because  Wittgenstein’s 
assumption that the relation between the 
propositional and the object levels is straight-
forward fails. The main problem is that 
Wittgenstein never specified what should be 
the number of argument places of a proposi-
tion in general; it is what is missing to give an 
appropriate use of Hertz’s idea and calculate 
freedom more accurately.
4. final remarks
Understanding how the human mind 
reasons and how reasoning influences be-
havior represents very important topics in 
the field of the social sciences today (like 
economics) not only from a theoretical per-
spective, but also from a practical one. Such 
understanding could be useful in order to as-
sess and solve, for instance, leadership issues, 
i.e. by determining the breadth and limits of 
cooperative behavior inside organizations, 
or by explaining how collective behavior 
emerges from individual behaviors in differ-
ent social groups etc. In this paper I focused 
on a historical aspect concerning an impor-
tant step in the development of modeling 
human reasoning: the suggestion from late 
19th century’s epistemology of science to as-
sociate the modeling of physical phenomena 
with logical modeling, in order to figure out 
what human reasoning is really about. As we 
can easily see from this study, the endeavor 
was troublesome and prone to severe difficul-
ties, even when seeking to analyze reasoning 
about simple things such as the color of ob-
jects.  Nevertheless,  this  scientific  approach 
to representation and inference managed to 143 Change and Leadership
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raise a larger interest for logical modeling 
and it led over time to one of the most effec-
tive tools that we currently have in model-
ing both human reasoning and behavior: i.e. 
game-theory, a very sophisticated abstract 
tool  that  Ludwig  Wittgenstein’s  early  at-
tempts could not really anticipate.
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